RISS Workshop
- Date
- November 10,2025 pm3:30～pm5:00
- Lecturers
- Junghyun Park (Seoul National University)
- Title
- Does New technology induce Task Mismatch? Experimental evidence from Generative AI
- Abstract
- While the adoption of new technologies like Generative AI promises to enhance productivity, its impact on individual decision-making and labor allocation remains unclear. This study uses a laboratory experiment to investigate how access to a new technology (Generative AI) influences individuals' choices between tasks that are either complemented or not complemented by it. We find that while AI availability predictably shifts choices toward the technology-complementary task, it also significantly increases the rate of “task mismatch,” where individuals abandon tasks in which they hold a comparative advantage, resulting in lower earnings and suboptimal allocation. This inefficiency stems from a behavioral bias: access to AI induces systematic overconfidence in one’s performance in the complementary task. Participants consistently overestimated their productivity with AI, leading to inefficient choices. We further test two interventions designed to mitigate this bias. Providing social information about the choices of others and allowing for repeated task selection both proved effective in reducing overconfidence and, consequently, the incidence of task mismatch. These findings highlight a critical behavioral friction in technology adoption, showing that without intervention, overconfidence may misallocate labor and erode the productivity gains of new technologies.
- Details
- ※Researchers only
RISS Workshop
- Date
- October 16,2025 pm4:30～pm6:00
- Lecturers
- Kazuki Nishikawa（ The University of Osaka ）
- Title
- Automation under relational contracts
- Abstract
- I examine firms’ incentives to invest in automation under relational contracts. In these contracts, the lack of formal enforcement mechanisms can lead to worker shirking, thereby strengthening the incentive to automate. At the same time, automation may weaken the firm–worker relationship, creating a countervailing incentive to limit automation in order to preserve its value. The interplay of these opposing forces determines the relative level of automation investment under relational versus formal contracts. From a policy perspective, the results indicate that strengthening workers’ rights does not necessarily raise workers’ surplus.
- Details
- ※Researchers only
RISS Workshop
- Date
- September 26,2025 Open at 16:00 / Start at 16:30 - around 18:00
- Lecturers
- Hideki Shimada（ A senior researcher at National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST) ）
- Title
- Who provides electricity data? Field experimental evidence on information provision, willingness to accept, and selection
- Overview
- We study consumers' decisions regarding the provision of their electricity consumption data to third parties. To elicit consumers' intentions of and willingness to accept (WTA) compensation for providing this data, we design a survey experiment involving an actual data transaction. Participants are randomly assigned to treatments that differ in the information provided about the benefits of sharing their electricity data. We find that these information treatments reduce participants' intentions to share their data. However, the treatments do not significantly affect the distribution of elicited WTA. We observe substantial selection effects in data provision by comparing attributes, such as risk preferences and average electricity consumption, between participants who agree to provide their data, either with or without monetary compensation, and those who decline. Our findings underscore the importance for policymakers of understanding incentives for consumers to share electricity consumption data and the careful application of results from previous studies using such data.
- Details
- ※Researchers only
RISS Seminar
- Date
- September 18,2025 Open at 13:30 / Start at 14:00 - around 17:20
- Program
- 14:00〜15:00 Talk 1 : "Collusion under Strategic Interaction and Regulation:An Experiment."
Presented by Jeong Yeol Kim (KDI School of Public Policy and Management) and Daeyoung Jeong (Yonsei University)
15:00～15:20 Discussion 1
15:20～15:30 Coffee Break
15:30〜16:30 Talk 2 : "Communication and Information Revelation in Infinitely Repeated Auction Experiment"
Presented by Hajime Kobayashi (Kansai University) ,Katsunori Ohta (Kansai University) , and Tiffany Tsz Kwan TSE (Osaka University)
16:30～16:50 Discussion 2
16:50～17:20 Free Talk
17:30～ Reception - Registration for participation
- ［Registration Form］（Please register by September 10th）
https://zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_uZ0rJN_uSnOpIsSi578Dig - Details
- ※Reseachers only
RISS Workshop
- Date
- June 20,2025 pm4:30～pm6:00
- Lecturers
- Haejun Jeon（Associate Professor, The University of Osaka）
- Co-author
- Michi Nishihara (Professor, The University of Osaka)
- Title
- Certainty equivalent and uncertainty premium of time-to-build
- Abstract
- Time-to-build of an investment project induces a discrepancy between the timing of investment and that of revenue generation. Jeon (2024) showed that uncertainty in the time-to-build always accelerates investment and enhances pre-investment firm value, regardless of its distribution. This study examines the extent to which the uncertainty advances the timing of investment and improves firm value. Specifically, we show that there always exists a unique certainty equivalent of uncertain time-to-build and derive it in an analytic form. This enables us to derive the investment strategy with uncertain time-to-build in the form of the one that would have been adopted in the absence of such uncertainty. Even without full knowledge of the uncertainty, the firm can approximate the optimal investment strategy using only the mean and variance of time-to-build. We also clarify the positive impact of entropic risk measure of time-to-build on investment and derive the dual representation of the certainty equivalent of time-to-build based on relative entropy. Furthermore, we show that there always exists an uncertainty equivalent of fixed time-to-build. This implies that the firm can deduce the equivalent risk that its investment strategy, established without considering uncertainty in time-to-build, implicitly assumes. Lastly, we illustrate the practical application of our findings using some representative probability distributions and analyze the effects of the variance of time-to-build. In particular, we contrast the effects of uncertainty in demand with those of uncertainty in time-to-build, deriving the level of variance in time-to-build that offsets the negative impact of increased demand volatility on investment.
- Details
- ※Researchers only
JSPS-NFSC 2024 International Workshop
- Date
- December 14-15,2024
- Theme
- Social Media Advertising and Digital Marketing
- Sponsoring Journal
- The Review of Socionetwork Strategies
- Sponsoring Institution
- Research Institute for Socionetwork Strategies at Kansai University
- Details
- Click here for details.
※Researchers only
Seminar by Invited Researcher
- Program
- Date
- November 19,2024 pm1:00～pm2:30
- Lecturers
- Professor Naomi Soderstrom
（Professor of Accounting Faculty of Business and Economics The University of Melbourne） - Title
- Introduction of Sustainability Accounting
- Details
- ※Students and Faculty（Researchers）only
RISS Workshop
- Date
- November 12,2024 pm3:30～pm5:00
- Venue
- Online（Zoom）
- Lecturers
- Tomohisa Okada （Lecturer, Daito Bunka University）
- Co-researcher
- Toshihiro Tsuchihashi（Professor, Daito Bunka University）
- Title
- Two-Dimensional Dictator Game - Money and Tasks -
- Abstract
- This study aims to enhance our understanding of institutions that elicit altruistic behavior in decision-making by expanding the traditional dictator game, which typically focuses on monetary distribution. We introduce a two-dimensional dictator game experiment that simultaneously allocates both money and unpleasant tasks. Our findings reveal that allocation rates in the two-dimensional game significantly improved compared to the traditional one-dimensional game. However, when focusing solely on monetary allocation, these rates deteriorated. This phenomenon may be attributed to two factors: (i) individuals may avoid being seen as unfair when they make decisions that benefit themselves in both dimensions (social image concerns), and (ii) by favorably allocating tasks to others, they might justify their self-serving monetary decisions (self image concerns). Additionally, we implemented several other treatments, such as having two dictators where one distributes money and the other allocates tasks, enabling us to compare results across treatments and explore which distribution of authority leads to the fairest outcomes.
- Details
- ※Researchers only
Lectures by Visiting Researchers organized by RISS
- Program
- Date
- November 11,2024 pm4:20～pm6:20
- Lecturers
- Professor Naomi Soderstrom （Professor of Accounting Faculty of Business and Economics The University of Melbourne）
- Title
- Are Climate Scenario Analysis Disclosures Valued by Investors?
- Abstract
- Scenario analysis is a well-established management tool for developing and executing organizational strategy. While scenario analysis in general and stress testing as a form of scenario analysis in the banking sector have been used for policy-making and benchmarking, climate-related scenario analysis is a more recent development. Emergent accounting standards include requirements for firms to apply and disclose climate scenarios. This paper examines whether firms' usage of climate scenarios is valued by financial markets. Relying on voluntary disclosures from US publicly traded firms in the CDP database from 2018 to 2022, we find that firms conducting scenario analysis are associated with higher market valuations, with more positive results for firms that incorporate quantitative insights into their strategies. Further, our results are sensitive to the firm's overall sustainability performance. The findings highlight the importance of using scenario analysis to inform strategy and the need for clearer guidance on disclosure practices.
- Details
- ※Faculty（Researchers）only
RISS Workshop
- Date
- November 9,2024 pm3:30～pm4:30
- Lecturers
- Daichi Shirai （Lecturer, Tohoku Gakuin University）
- Title
- Sources of Inequality and Business Cycles: Evidence from the US and Japan (Joint with Masaru Inaba and Kengo Nutahara)
- Abstract
- We investigate (i) sources of inequality and business cycle fluctuations in the US and Japan and (ii) the effects of reducing inequality on business cycles. Developing a heterogeneous-agent business cycle model with unconstrained and hand-to-mouth households and various wedges to represent economic distortions, we estimate the model by the Bayesian methods. We find that, in the US, the labor market distortion specific to unconstrained households is the common factor that significantly impacts business cycles and consumption inequality, whereas there are no common factors in Japan. In both countries, the primary source of business cycles is distortions in aggregate productivity, and that of consumption inequality is household-specific labor market distortions. We assess labor market reforms and redistribution policy as means to reduce consumption inequality. Our findings imply that the effects of lowering inequality on business cycle volatility depend on the country and how it is done. We also find that labor market reform is welfare-improving in both countries while redistribution policy is not.
- Details
- ※Researchers only